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Abstract 
This is a commentary on Kemmerer (2016), Categories of Object Concepts Across Languages and 
Brains: The Relevance of Nominal Classification Systems to Cognitive Neuroscience, DOI: 
10.1080/23273798.2016.1198819. 
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1.  Introduction 
Kemmerer (2016) first reviews nominal classification systems, in which classifiers (linguistic 
elements that accompany nouns) highlight featural information in noun meanings, including animacy, 
shape, size, constitution, and interaction.  Kemmerer then reviews neuroscience research showing that 
the brain represents these features, often in exquisite detail.  Specifically, neuroscience research has 
established neural systems in the brain that distinguish specific forms of features for: 
(1) animacy (e.g., species, social status, rationality), 
(2) shape (e.g., geometric solids, non-accidental properties), 
(3) size (e.g., function, gender, deviation from average size), 
(4) constitution (e.g., material independent of shape), 
(5) interaction/function (e.g., actions, outcomes). 
Importantly, however, this neuroscience research has not yet used classifiers to establish the neural 
bases of these features, but has primarily used other linguistic stimuli together with pictures.  Thus, no 
actual relations have yet been established between the features that classifiers represent and the neural 
representations of these features. 
Kemmerer’s important insight and message is that classification systems, not only offer a 
powerful tool for exploring conceptual processing in the brain, but must be addressed to fully 
understand how the brain implements conceptual processing.  Because classification systems are central 
in many language communities, we cannot understand how the brain realizes conceptual processing 
without establishing their roles and long-term effects.  Furthermore, because the presence of a 
classification system in an individual’s language environment changes how their brain implements 
conceptual processing behaviorally, the potential effects on the underlying neural systems must be 
explored as well (in the spirit of the Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis; e.g., Enfield, 2015; Everett, 2013). 
In this commentary, I propose that the issues associated with understanding the neural bases of 
classification systems constitute a microcosm of current issues associated with understanding the neural 
bases of conceptual processing more generally, including:  (1) the genetic vs. experiential origins of 
conceptual features, (2) the roles of grounding and abstraction in representing features, (3) the roles of 
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basic cognitive mechanisms in conceptual processing, including attention, frequency, and context-
dependent meaning construction, (4) the roles of concepts in situated cognition and action.  The 
following sections address each issue in turn. 
2.  Origins of Conceptual Features 
On the one hand, the exquisite sensitivity that the brain shows to fine distinctions in conceptual 
features is impressive.  On the other, this sensitivity is perhaps not so surprising, given that any 
discriminable difference in conceptual information must have a neural basis.  If people are confronted 
with two different features and can tell them apart, different neural representations must be responsible. 
2.1. Genetic vs. experiential origins.  A key and classic issue concerns how much the 
distinctions that underlie classifiers reflect genetic vs. experiential contributions.  The fact that some 
classifiers occur across languages suggests that they reflect genetic origins.  Conversely, the 
complementary fact that some classifiers are unique to a specific language suggests that they originate 
in the experience of the respective language community. 
In principle, even common classifiers could originate purely in experience, simply indicating 
that the respective categories in the environment are common across language cultures, such that 
acquired conceptual knowledge is forced to distinguish them.  Perhaps the most likely possibility is 
that neural systems have evolved to anticipate the kinds of featural distinctions found in typical human 
environments, but that experience is required to establish the ultimate representations that implement 
them.  In other words, genetic constraints exist on these features, but environmental experience is 
necessary for constructing the specific neural structures that represent them in the brain (e.g., Elman et 
al., 1996; Malt, 1995).  Kemmerer's (2016) observation that non-human species sometimes distinguish 
these features might indeed suggest a strong genetic contribution.  Again, however, a shared 
environment across species could play significant roles in establishing these features. 
2.2. Developmental pruning.  Regardless of the difficulty in establishing the origins of the 
features that underlie classifiers, an important issue to bear in mind concerns how children acquire 
them during language acquisition.  An intriguing possibility is that these features develop similar to 
how phoneme and face categories develop (e.g., Maurer & Werker, 2014; Werker & Hensch, 2015).  
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Initially, evolutionary-based neural architecture anticipates the space of possible features that could be 
encountered for all possible classifiers and their associated referents, with the experience of specific 
features then pruning and entrenching the features that remain.  If so, then classification systems may 
be a way of selecting and entrenching features that a language community anticipates will be important 
for its members. 
3.  Roles of Grounding and Abstraction 
Because neuroscience research has not yet addressed the neural bases of classifiers, we have no 
idea of whether or not they utilize the neural systems that Kemmerer (2016) reviews.  Certainly, they 
may, but alternatives for representing the featural information associated with classifiers must be 
considered as well.  Current research on conceptual processing suggests diverse ways in which the 
semantic content of classifiers could be represented.  Following Barsalou (2016), such content could 
potentially be represented via various mechanisms associated with grounding and abstraction.  These 
possibilities are addressed in turn. 
3.1. Grounding.  An obvious possibility is that the semantic content of a classifier could be 
represented by the brain areas that process the relevant features of its referents during perception and 
action (e.g., Barsalou, 1999, 2008, Martin, 2007, 2015).  In other words, the brain areas that 
Kemmerer (2016) reviews, not only support the processing of these features during perception and 
action, they also represent (ground) the meanings of classifiers that refer to these features.  As a 
consequence, hearing or reading a classifier reactivates or simulates the respective feature areas, 
thereby adding (or strengthening) them in the representation of the classified noun. 
3.2. Abstraction.  Barsalou (2016) reviews several types of abstraction that could potentially 
also represent classifier semantics.  One possibility is that a compressed representation of a classifier’s 
features (such as a prototype) is stored in association areas and grounded in the corresponding features 
of the relevant sensory-motor systems (e.g., Binder, 2016; Fernandino et al., 2015).  These 
compressed abstractions could potentially represent a classifier’s semantics without sensory-motor 
grounding becoming active, such that the areas Kemmerer (2016) reviews play little or no role when 
classifiers are processed.  Alternatively, both the abstract and grounded representations could become 
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active together to represent a classifier’s semantics as a coordinated distributed network. 
Another possibility is that distributed linguistic representations play a central role in classifier 
semantics (e.g., Baroni & Lenci, 2010; Erk, 2012; Landauer, McNamara, Dennis, & Kintsch, 2013).  
Given the conventional linguistic nature of classifiers, it makes sense that they would capitalize on this 
form of abstraction.  Specifically, a classifier could be associated with all (or many of) the word forms 
for the nouns it classifies, such that these word forms represent the classifier’s meaning in a distributed 
manner.  When the classifier is heard or read, it activates these word forms (or a subset), which 
contribute to the classifier’s meaning.  Because one of these word forms is likely to be the noun 
currently classified, the classifier primes it, speeding up linguistic processing. 
A final possibility is that classifiers are represented with amodal symbols arbitrarily related to 
their meaning.  Although it’s not clear where in the brain amodal symbols are stored (if anywhere) or 
how they work (Barsalou, 2016), it is probably important to entertain the possibility that classifiers, 
like any other concepts, could potentially be represented in some way that has nothing to do with 
grounding or linguistic forms. 
In summary, a potential issue for research on classifiers is to establish how grounding and 
abstraction implement classifier semantics.  A likely possibility, consistent with how other concepts 
are represented, is that multiple representations work together, including grounding, compressed 
abstractions, and distributed linguistic representations (e.g., Andrews, Frank, & Vigliocco, 2014; 
Barsalou, Santos, Simmons, & Wilson, 2008; Connell & Lynott, 2013; Louwerse, 2011; Paivio, 1986). 
4.  Roles of Basic Cognitive Mechanisms 
A variety of additional cognitive mechanisms potentially influence classifier semantics, 
including attention, frequency, superordinate categories, concept composition, and context-dependent 
meaning construction.  Each is addressed in turn. 
4.1. Attention.  A likely possibility, consistent with Kemmerer's (2016) review, is that a 
classifier draws attention to relevant features in a noun’s meaning, thereby increasing their salience 
and activation.  As much neuroscience research shows, focusing selective attention on a feature 
increases neural activity in brain regions that process it (e.g., Corbetta, Miezin, Dobmeyer, Shulman, 
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& Petersen, 1991; Schoenfeld et al., 2007).  Consistent with grounded approaches, a classifier 
activates relevant sensory-motor regions that represent its underlying features by causing selective 
attention to focus on them.  To the extent that attention plays this role, it becomes essential to consider 
attentional processes when attempting to understand how classifiers contribute to the representation of 
noun meaning.  Consistent with many traditional approaches to conceptual processing (e.g., Kruschke, 
1992; Nosofsky, 2011; Trabasso & Bower, 1975), attention highlights featural information relevant 
for a concept, with classifiers constituting one means of doing so. 
4.2. Frequency.  A closely related possibility is that repeatedly focusing attention on a feature 
strengthens its representation in memory, causing it to become entrenched and increasingly available 
for processing.  Indeed, many theories have argued that attention and frequency work together to 
establish representations in memory (e.g., Barsalou, 1999; Craik, 2002; Craik & Lockhart, 1972; 
Trabasso & Bower, 1975).  Where attention goes, memory follows. 
To the extent that a classifier focuses attention on the neural representation of a feature 
frequently, the population of neurons processing the feature is likely to grow, as is the strength of its 
connections to related processing areas.  As a result, an entrenched distributed network develops to 
represent the classifier’s meaning.  To the extent that such a process underlies classifier use, it is 
important to examine the early acquisition and development of these networks.  Because the networks 
that represent classifiers are also likely to become associated with their associated nouns, these 
additional pathways are also important to examine.  As a classifier is learned, a well-established 
entrenched network should develop for it and the nouns it classifies. 
One important issue to consider is whether classifiers simply produce frequency increments on 
conceptual representations, or whether they produce additional effects as well.  Perhaps the only effect 
of using a classifier frequently with a noun is to increase the overall salience of the classifier’s 
features in the noun’s representation via the repeated focusing of attention on them.  If classifiers have 
additional effects on semantic content, it is important to specify what they are, and to develop 
empirical methods for establishing them. 
4.3. Superordinate categories.  As Kemmerer (2016) notes, classifiers can be viewed as 
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superordinate categories that classify their associated nouns as basic or subordinate categories.  When 
a classifier indicates that a noun is animate, for example, the animate classifier functions as a 
superordinate category for animate entities. 
If classifiers function as superordinate categories, several issues arise.  First, would performing 
a superordinate classification in a non-classifier language be the same as using the corresponding 
classifier in a classifier language?  If, for example, someone says, “I just bought yet another inanimate 
object, a car, yesterday” is this equivalent to replacing “inanimate object” with the appropriate 
classifier (and classifier syntax) in a classifier language?  If so, then this suggests that non-classifier 
languages have the same linguistic tools as classifier languages, but don’t require that these tools 
always be used when referring to a noun.  When they are used, however, they have essentially the 
same impact as a classifier, drawing attention to the relevant features and strengthening their 
representations in memory. 
A robust finding in the behavioral concepts literature suggests that superordinate categories 
often become implicitly active for basic and subordinate categories, even when a superordinate 
category is not mentioned explicitly.  Barsalou and Ross (1986), for example, showed that when 
people process basic categories (e.g., apple, hammer, shirt), their respective superordinate categories 
become active implicitly (i.e., fruit, tool, clothing).  Similarly, many experiments show that when 
people list the features of concepts, they produce superordinates frequently, indicating that they are 
readily available (e.g., McRae, Cree, Seidenberg, & McNorgan, 2005; also see Barsalou & Wiemer-
Hastings, 2005; Santos, Chaigneau, Simmons, & Barsalou, 2011; Wu & Barsalou, 2009). 
Such findings suggest that important superordinates become active for concepts even in non-
classifier languages.  If so, then one potentially important issue is whether the activation of 
superordinate representations is roughly equivalent to the use of classifiers.  Perhaps one important 
difference is that classifiers draw attention to features that typical superordinates don’t usually capture, 
perhaps because it’s important to make these additional features available for cultural interactions.  
This possibility is explored later. 
4.4. Noun phrase composition.  Languages generally include a wide variety of syntactic tools 
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for modifying nouns, including adjective modifiers, noun modifiers, and phrase modifiers (e.g., 
prepositional phrases, relative clauses).  Thus, an important question is whether classifiers offer a unique 
mechanism for modifying nouns, or whether they are similar in character to other syntactic tools for 
modifying nouns.  Does a classifier have essentially the same effects as an adjective or noun modifier 
accompanying a noun?  For example, does the adjective modifier in “large car” produce the same effect 
as combining a classifier for large with car?  Similarly, does the noun modifier in “wood spoon” 
produce the same effect as combining a classifier for wooden composition with spoon?  If so, then the 
primary function of classifiers, similar to noun modifiers and superordinates, may be to focus attention 
on relevant features, increasing their salience and entrenchment in concepts.  Again, however, classifiers 
may play additional important roles. 
Perhaps one way to frame the issue is as follows:  If two non-classifier languages have 
different distributions of adjective and noun modifiers for animacy, shape, size, composition, and 
interaction, are the effects on the respective conceptual systems comparable to having two different 
classifier systems that highlight analogous featural differences?  A similar issue exists for different 
distributions of superordinates in two language communities. 
4.5. Context-dependent meaning construction.  Increasing research demonstrates that a 
given concept is represented in infinitely many ways, taking different forms in different contexts to 
serve current goal-directed activity (e.g., Barsalou, 2016; Casasanto & Lupyan, 2015; Connell & 
Lynott, 2014; Kemmerer, 2015; Lebois, Wilson-Mendenhall, & Barsalou, 2015; Yee & Thompson-
Schill, 2016).  Classifiers similarly appear to implement context-dependence in at least two ways. 
First, classifiers implement context-dependence with respect to different language communities.  
If one community uses a classifier that highlights a feature but another community doesn’t, then the 
classifier may cause the feature to be more salient in the first community than in the second.  Across 
language communities, different classifier systems for a given conceptual domain (e.g., animals) could 
cause the domain to be represented differently, as a function of how classifiers differentially draw 
attention to features and entrench them in memory. 
Second, once an entrenched conceptual system is in place for a given language community, 
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classifiers offer one (of many) mechanisms for producing context-dependent representations.  As 
Kemmerer (2016) notes, some languages allow different classifiers to be used with the same noun, 
depending on which features are relevant in the current context.  As different features become relevant 
across contexts, different classifiers are used to highlight them, thereby contributing to context-
dependent representations. 
Thus, another potential issue to explore in establishing the neural bases of classifiers is how 
they contribute to differences in meaning, first, across language communities, and second, across 
communicative contexts.  Indeed, such issues lie at the heart of Kemmerer's (2016) proposal that the 
conceptual system cannot be fully understood without understanding the role of classifiers.  Because 
classifiers have the potential to alter the structure of a conceptual system and its use, we cannot 
understand conceptual systems without taking classifiers into account.  The additional point here is 
that classifier systems could potentially be viewed as belonging to a larger family of mechanisms that 
cause conceptual representations to be context-dependent. 
5.  Roles in Situated Cognition and Action 
Perhaps classifiers are meaningless conventions whose original historical uses have become 
opaque.  Although classifiers highlight features in an object’s representation, this highlighting process 
may no longer play any important cultural functions.  Instead, it is simply a remnant of functions that 
have long been forgotten. 
Alternatively, classifiers could serve to consistently make features salient that are important for 
how a language community organizes social interaction and object use.  By consistently activating these 
features, classifiers establish stable conceptual representations in memory that support the community’s 
goals.  Perhaps linguistic communities continue to use classifiers because the conceptual stability that 
they produce remains useful. 
Kemmerer (2016) doesn’t explore the roles that classifiers potentially play situated cognition 
and action.  If classifiers are simply conventions, there is probably no need to explore such roles 
further.  If, however, classifiers continue to help coordinate social cognition and action, then exploring 
these roles is likely to be important in fully understanding them.  Many of the features that classifiers 
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highlight could potentially serve such purposes.  Animacy classifiers, for example, could prime 
features for status, age, gender, and rationality that initiate appropriate social interaction and 
communication.  Similarly, shape classifiers could prime features relevant to culturally important 
affordances and actions. 
If classifiers participate in such forms of situated activity, many more neural systems are likely 
to be involved in implementing them than those that represent object features.  In particular, systems 
that represent goals, actions, mental states, and outcomes may all enter into the distributed neural 
networks associated with classifiers, giving neuroscientists even more to do in understanding how 
classifiers operate in the cognitive system, together with the underlying neural mechanisms. 
Importantly, it may be difficult to establish these distributed networks by only studying classifiers, 
words, and phrases out of context.  To establish the complete neural systems underlying classifiers may 
require examining them in more complete contexts of situated action (e.g., Barsalou, 2016; Huettig, 
Rommers, & Meyer, 2011; Tanenhaus, Spivey-Knowlton, Eberhard, & Sedivy, 1995). 
6.  Conclusions 
As I hope has become clear, classifiers constitute a microcosm of important issues facing 
research on concepts.  Following Kemmerer (2016), we will learn a lot about conceptual processing and 
its relation to language from better understanding them.  We cannot understand the human conceptual 
system without taking classifiers into account, given their potential to shape it significantly. 
Additionally, research on classifiers offers important opportunities for better understanding:  
(1) how conceptual features originate in the cognitive system, (2) how grounding, abstraction, and 
distributed linguistic representations work together to produce conceptual processing, (3) how general 
cognitive processes such as attention, repetition, and context-dependence contribute to language, and 
(4) how cognitive processes, including language, develop to support situated cognition and action. 
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